

Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Bağdād*)

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Miskawaih's *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt*¹⁾ is a short treatise on the grades of human happiness and the means of acquiring them, composed before his

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¹⁾ *Editions and MSS.* The work was apparently first published in Tehran in 1314, in the margin of a lithograph edition of the *Rasā'il Mullā Ṣadrā*, pp. 422–462. Another edition appeared in Cairo in 1335/1917 by 'Alī at-Ṭūbġī [at-Tōbgī] as-Suyūṭī under the title, *K. as-Sa'āda li-Ibn Miskawaih fī falsafat al-aḥlāq*; it was apparently reprinted there in 1346(?) / 1928. This very defective edition is based on the famous Avicenna *maḡmū'a* in Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, *Ḥikma* 6 M[uṣṭafā Fāḍil], ff. 210^r–217^v. (at-Ṭōbgī mistakenly refers to this MS, p. 74, as *Ḥikma* 6 only. For a full description of this MS see my forthcoming, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*.) Another MS is found in Diyarbakır, A dolabı, No. 2213, ff. 1^v–8^r (see R. Şeşen, *Diyarbakır Kütüphanesinde Bulunan Bazı Yazmalar*, in: *Araştırma* 4, 1966, 205). The second half of the work is also extant, without title or ascription, in MS Gotha, Pertsch 1158, ff. 163^r1–167^v2. In what follows reference has been made to the Cairo 1917 edition.

Title. The Cairo MS bears the title, *K. as-Sa'āda*; the Diyarbakır MS, according to Şeşen, has *K. Tartīb as-sa'āda*. Miskawaih himself, in his *Tahdīb al-aḥlāq* (ed. Q. Zurayq [C. K. Zurayk], Beyrut 1966) refers to it (pp. 15, 91, 124) as *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt*, and once (p. 49) with the more descriptive title, *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt wa-*

celebrated *Tahdīb al-aḥlāq*.²⁾ It falls naturally into two parts: the first part (pp. 36–58) deals with the nature and different kinds of happiness, and the second part (pp. 58–73) offers a classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy. The connection between the two parts is provided by the following passage (p. 58.2–17):³⁾

Whoever wishes to perfect himself as a human being [*insāniya*] and reach the rank [*amr*] which is meant by 'human nature'⁴⁾ in order to integrate his self [*li-yatimma dātahu*] and have the same preferences and intentions as those of the philosophers, let him acquire these two arts [*ṣind'atain*] — I mean the theoretical and practical parts of philosophy; as a result, there will accrue to him the essential natures of things [*ḥaqā'iq al-umūr*] by means of the theoretical part, and good deeds by means of the practical part. As for the classification [of the parts] of these two arts and how they are to be followed toward the two goals mentioned above, this has to be done in accordance with what

manāzil al-'ulūm. For later references to the work see the book by Arkoun listed below.

Bibliography. This treatise received little serious attention. Brockelmann (GAL) does not mention it. İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (Miskeveyhin Felsefesi Eserleri, in: Darülfünun [İstanbul Üniversitesi] İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası, Sene 3, No. 11, 1929, p. 60) has a brief report in which he mentions both the Cairo MS and the edition, but no Istanbul MSS (are there no MSS of the work in Istanbul?). The following works offer little beyond generalities: 'A. 'Izzat, *"Ibn" Miskawaih. Falsafatuhu l-aḥlāqīya wa-maṣādiruhā*, Cairo 1946; M. Abdul Haq Ansari, *The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawaih*, Aligarh 1964; and B. H. Siddiqi, *Al-Farabi and Miskawaih on the Classification of Sciences*, in: Iqbal, 12.iii, 1964, pp. 55–63. M. Arkoun, *Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe au IV^e/X^e siècle: Miskawayh, Philosophe et Historien [Études Musulmanes XII]*, Paris 1970, attempts to re-write 'Izzat on a more sophisticated level; bibliographical information and a brief summary of *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt* are given on pp. 107f.; extensive quotations in French and an analysis are found on pp. 226–233. Finally S. Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh and Paul the Persian, in: *Irān-Shināsi*, Vol. 2, No. 2 [Serial No. 3], Tehran 1971, pp. 121–129, marks the first attempt to deal with the source-historical problems posed by the treatise.

²⁾ Miskawaih mentions the *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt* four times in the *Tahdīb*: see above, note 1. Arkoun, p. 107, would place the date of composition between the years 358–360/968–970, when Miskawaih was still in the service of Abū l-Faḍl b. al-'Amīd (and thus just before the latter's death). In all probability, it is one of Miskawaih's earliest philosophical works.

³⁾ I follow the correct readings in the Cairo MS. Cf. the translation of this passage in Arkoun, pp. 227f.

⁴⁾ *Hulq al-insān*. Arkoun translates, "la création de l'homme," apparently reading, *ḥalq al-insān*.

Aristotle the philosopher did. For it was he who classified and sorted [the parts of] philosophy and who established for it a method to be followed from beginning to end, as Paul [*Bālus*] mentioned in what he wrote to Anūšīrwān.

He [i.e. Paul] said:⁵⁾ Prior to this philosopher, [the parts of] philosophy were dispersed like the rest of the useful things which God created and with the exploitation of which he entrusted men's natural disposition and the capacity he gave them for this purpose — [things] like medicaments which, found dispersed in the countryside and the mountains, result in useful medication when collected and combined. In a similar manner Aristotle collected the dispersed parts of philosophy, combined each part with what was conformable to it, and placed it in its [appropriate] place, so that he produced from it a complete course of treatment [*šifā*] by means of which the souls are cured of the diseases of ignorance.

After this brief introduction to the second part, there follows a detailed classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy. These are its contents in outline form:

Cairo 1917, page/line	Section No.: §§	Contents
58.11–17	I	Introduction (second paragraph translated above).
58.17–59.9	II	Theoretical and practical philosophy. The primary parts of theoretical philosophy.
59.9–60.2	III	The order of the parts of theoretical philosophy.
60.2–61.2	IV	Aristotle investigates the various classes of persuasive arguments [<i>marātib al-iqnā'āt</i>]. This investigation enables one to distinguish between true and false opinions and to correct the false ones. The art [<i>šind'a</i>] that does this is logic.
61.2–62.1	V	Among the other arts, Aristotle used prosody (' <i>arūd</i> ') and grammar [<i>naḥw</i>] as examples of logic. Ways in which prosody and grammar resemble logic.
62.1–63.4	VI	Whoever is ignorant of logic does not know whether his opinions are right or wrong, or the reasons why they are right, if they are so, and why they are wrong, if they are so. Logic teaches one this.

⁵⁾ Cf. the translation of this paragraph in Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh, pp. 123f.

Cairo 1917, page/line	Section No.: §§	Contents
63.4-15	VII	Aristotle divided the component parts of logic in the same way in which he divided the other sciences (reference to §§ II and III, above). There are five kinds of syllogisms [<i>qiyāsāt</i>] and statements [<i>aqdāwīl</i>]: 1) inducing certainty [<i>yaqīnīya</i>]: true in all respects; 2) inducing imaginary impressions [<i>muhayyila</i>]: false in all respects; 3) inducing strong opinions [<i>ẓunūnīya</i>]: more true than false; 4) inducing error [<i>muḡlīla</i>]: more false than true; 5) persuasive [<i>muqni'a</i>]: equally true and false.
63.15-66.10	VIII	Aristotle composed a book for each one of these five parts: 1) <i>Analytica Posteriora</i> ; 2) <i>Poetica</i> ; 3) <i>Topica</i> ; 4) <i>Sophistici Elenchi</i> ;
(65.2-12)	VIIIa	[Translator's comment:] ⁶⁾ Etymology of <i>sophistēs</i> . 5) <i>Rhetorica</i> ; 6) Rules applying to all the preceding: <i>Analytica Priora</i> ;
(66.3-5)	VIIIb	[Translator's comment:] In the old translation, <i>K. al-Qiyās</i> is found in two parts: a) <i>qiyās</i> , b) <i>burhān</i> . 7) Building blocks of a syllogism: a) terms [<i>alfāz</i> ; the <i>Categoriae</i> is implied but not mentioned]; b) intelligible concepts [<i>ma'nā</i> , <i>ma'qūl</i> ; De Interpretatione is implied but not mentioned]. The above division of logic into eight parts constitutes the analytic approach [<i>ṭarīq at-tahlīl</i>].
66.10-67.15	IX	According to the synthetic approach [<i>ṭarīq at-tarkīb</i>], Aristotle put the works on logic in the following order: 1) <i>Categoriae</i> 2) De Interpretatione 3) <i>Analytica Priora</i> 4) <i>Analytica Posteriora</i> 5) <i>Topica</i> 6) <i>Sophistici Elenchi</i> 7) <i>Rhetorica</i> 8) <i>Poetica</i> .
67.15-68.14	X	The noblest of these books is (4), <i>Analytica Posteriora</i> [<i>K. al-Burhān</i>]. The first three books [in the order given in § IX] introduce it, the last four protect it.

⁶⁾ This anticipates the discussion to follow. See below, p. 232.

Cairo 1917, page/line	Section No.: §§	Contents
68.14-69.17	XI	Aristotle then composed books on theoretical philosophy, as divided above [§ III]: <i>Physica</i> , <i>De Caelo</i> , <i>De Generatione et Corruptione</i> , <i>De Plantis</i> , the book on animals [<i>K. al-Ḥayawān</i>] ⁷⁾ , <i>De Anima</i> , <i>De Sensu et Sensato</i> , <i>Metaphysica</i> .
(69.16)	XIa	[Translator's comment:] Some of the books of the <i>Metaphysica</i> were translated into Arabic, others were not.
69.17-70.10	XII	Aristotle then divided practical philosophy into its parts and composed books on each part: <i>Ethica</i> , <i>Oeconomica</i> , <i>Politica</i> .
(70.8-9)	XIIa	[Translator's comment:] Of Aristotle's works on <i>oeconomica</i> and <i>politica</i> only a part from the <i>Politica</i> was translated into Arabic. This work is in two books, ⁸⁾ as mentioned in the catalogue of his books.
70.10-15	XIII	Other works by Aristotle: Ὑπομνήματα [<i>Tadā-kīr</i>], ⁹⁾ works on mathematical sciences [<i>Ta'ālīm</i>].
(70.11-15)	XIIIa	[Translator's comment:] The <i>Tadā-kīr</i> are numerous, as mentioned in the catalogue of his books; of his mathematical works, nothing was translated into Arabic. The order in which they appear in Arabic and in which he ordered them, however, provides great benefit to those who want to perfect themselves.
70.15-71.14	XIV	For the student with the proper qualities, opportunities, and teacher, the time period necessary to learn Aristotle's philosophy is ten to twenty years.

⁷⁾ In both the Syriac and Arabic traditions, the 19 books of *Historia Animalium*, *De Partibus Animalium*, and *De Generatione Animalium* were known under this title. See J. Brugman and H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotle: Generation of Animals*, Leiden 1971, pp. 1-17, and the references cited there.

⁸⁾ The Cairo MS reads, *wa-huwa maqālatātūn*. The conjecture by Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh, p. 122, is thus correct.

⁹⁾ *Tadā-kīr* stands for ὑπομνήματα, not 'pragmateia,' as Arkoun, p. 233 suggests. Cf. the title in Ptolemy's catalogue, *ap. al-Qiftī* 46.21 and 47.14 (Lippert), *Tadakkurāt*.

Cairo 1917, page/line	Section No.: §§	Contents
71.14-73.4	XV	Order in which the books are to be studied: ethics, mathematics, logic, physics, metaphysics. At the end of this process the student will reach the final stage in which he can behold the essential natures of existing things.

One observation that can immediately be made about the above system of classification is its obvious derivation from the Alexandrian prolegomena to the study of Aristotle. Another is its close relationship to the chapter on logic in al-Fârâbî's *Ihşâ' al-'ulûm*. As a matter of fact, upon closer investigation it appears that §§ IV-X, above, and al-Fârâbî's chapter correspond both verbally and structurally to such an extent that it becomes, in effect, a question of one text being an adaptation of the other. Two examples will best illustrate this. The first is taken from § VI and is of a general nature; the second is from § VIII.5 and deals with a more specific subject, rhetorical statements:

Miskawaih 62.1-4
wa-inna man ġahila hâdihi
ş-şinâ'ata, 'arađa lahu bi-
d-darûrati allâ yaqifa

'alâ şawâbi man
aşâba kaifa aşâba wa-
min ayyi ġihatin aşâba,

wa-lâ 'alâ sahwi man
sahâ au ġaliṭa kaifa
wa-min aina sahâ au
ġaliṭa;

wa-taḥayyara fi l-âra' . . .

Miskawaih 65.12-14
wa-ammâ llaḏi [scil. al-
qiyâs] kiḏbuhu musâwin li-
şidqihi, fa-huwa llaḏi
yultamasu bihi

al-Fârâbî, Ihşâ', Amîn 71.7-11¹⁰)
fa-innâ in ġahilnâ l-mantiqa,

lam naqif, min ḥaitu
natayaqqanu, 'alâ şawâbi man
aşâba minhum kaifa aşâba wa-
min ayyi ġihatin aşâba, wa-kaifa
şârat ḥuġġatuhu tûġibu şihhata
ra'yihi, wa-lâ 'alâ ġalaṭi man
ġaliṭa minhum au ġalaṭa kaifa
wa-min ayyi ġihatin ġalaṭa au
ġaliṭa wa-kaifa şârat ḥuġġatuhu
lâ tûġibu şihhata ra'yihi; fa-
ya'riḏu lanâ 'inda ḏâlika immâ an
nataḥayyara fi l-âra'i kullihâ . . .

al-Fârâbî, Amîn 82.10-13
wa-l-aqâwîlu l-ḥiṭâbiyatu [sic
lege]

hiya llati
şa'nuhâ an yultamasa bihâ

¹⁰) Ed. 'Uṭmân Amîn, Cairo ³1968.

iqnâ'u mâ fi ayyi ra'yin
 kâna wa-an
 yaskuna s-sâmi'u ilâ mâ
 yuqâlu lahu wa-yuṣaddiqa
 bihi taṣḍiqan mâ

wa-huwa dûna z-ẓanni

l-qawf . . .

iqnâ'u l-insâni fi ayyi ra'yin
 kâna wa-an yumayyila ḍihnahu ilâ
 an yaskuna ilâ mâ
 yuqâlu lahu wa-yuṣaddiqa
 bihi taṣḍiqan mâ, immâ ad'afa wa-
 immâ aqwâ; fa-inna t-taṣḍiqâti
 l-iqnâ'iyata hiya dûna z-ẓanni
 l-qawf . . .

This type of correspondence between al-Fârâbî's chapter on logic and §§ IV–X in Miskawaih's text prevails throughout. The table below gives a full conspectus:¹¹⁾

Misk. No. §	al-Fârâbî, <i>Ḥṣā'</i>		Elias, CAG XVIII.i
Amin	G. Palencia		
I			
II			cf. 27.35–28.5
III			115.21–116.11
IV	69.5–70.7	24.9–26.1	
V	68.4–10	23.1–9	
VI	71.7–73.4; 75.5–9	27.4–29.8; 32.4–9	
VII	79.8–9; 85.9–11	37.12–3; 45.4–7	116.35–117.8
VIII.1	79.12–80.3	38.4–13	
2	83.4–9; 84.7–85.4	43.1–7; 44.3–10	
3	80.4–12	38.14–39.9	
4	80.13–81.3	39.10–40.2	
VIIIa	81.6–82.6	40.6–41.9	
5	82.10–13	42.1–5	
6			
7	86.1–15	45.9–46.12	
IX	87.1–89.5	46.13–50.6	
X	89.6–90.1; 90.14–91.2	50.7–51.4; 52.12–53.2	116.29–35
XI			115.21–116.14
XII			116.14–28
XIII			
XIV			cf. 121.20–123.11
XV			cf. 117.15–119.12

Table I

¹¹⁾ To facilitate matters, and in anticipation of what is to follow, I am also including in this table those passages from Elias which correspond to the text in Miskawaih. In the passages preceded by 'cf.' no direct correspondence is intended. The reference to G. Palencia is to his *Al-Fârâbî: Catálogo de las Ciencias*, Madrid ²1953.

At this point the following interrelated problems present themselves:¹²⁾ the identity of Paul mentioned in Miskawaih's text and the extent of his quotation; the sources of the classification given in Miskawaih's text, i.e., its exact relationship to the Alexandrian prolegomena to the study of Aristotle; the relationship between the texts of al-Fârâbî and Miskawaih; the concrete means by which the Alexandrian material reached al-Fârâbî and Miskawaih; and finally, the significance of this material and the classification it contains for the incipient philosophical school in Bagdâd and especially for al-Fârâbî. These problems will be dealt with in what follows.

I. Paul the Persian and Late Alexandrian Aristotelianism

The identity of Paul has already been established, independently of each other, by both Arkoun and Pines.¹³⁾ He is Paul the Persian, a Nestorian theologian and philosopher active at the court of Ḥusrau Anûširwân (regn. 531–578 AD), and a convert to Zoroastrianism when his ambition to become metropolitan bishop of Persis was thwarted.¹⁴⁾ Of his work there

¹²⁾ Numerous other problems, mostly of detail, but also regarding Miskawaih's *Tartīb as-sa'âdât* as a whole, cannot be discussed in the present paper. I hope to deal with them in a future edition of the text.

¹³⁾ Arkoun, p. 228, note 1; Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh, p. 124.

¹⁴⁾ For biographical and bibliographical references see, most conveniently, P. Kraus, *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, 14, 1934, p. 16 and notes 1–3. Paul's conversion is also mentioned in the Nestorian Chronicle of Se'ert, ed. A. Scher, *Patrologia Orientalis* (Paris 1911) VII.147, from where it was apparently taken by Barhebraeus, *Chron. Eccles.*, Vol. III [*sic*], p. 97 (Abbeloos–Lamy). The Chronicle of Se'ert also says that Anûširwân studied philosophy with him.

Information on Paul the Persian is not the easiest thing to track down, not the least of the reasons for which are the inconsistencies and oversights in the scholarly literature. To Kraus's references add the following: Giovanni Mercati, *Per la vita e gli scritti di "Paolo il Persiano."* *Appunti da una disputa di religione sotto Giustino e Giustiniano*, in his: *Note di letteratura biblica e cristiana antica* [Studi e Testi 5], Rome 1901, pp. 180–206; R. Duval, *La Littérature syriaque*, Paris 1907, pp. 249 f.; A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Bonn 1922, pp. 120 f. (s.n. Paulos v. Nisibis; as Kraus, p. 16, note 1, remarks, Baumstark inadvertently omitted the entry on Paul); J. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles I*, Vienna-Leipzig 1928, p. 74b; F. Altheim, *Geschichte der Hunnen*, Berlin 1961, III.89 f. Both Baumstark and Altheim refer to the article by Mercati as if it were an independent monograph and not part of a larger book, and give 1899 as the date of publication. Now it is likely that Mercati's article did appear independently as a pamphlet in 1899, but it is listed neither in the bibliography of his writings by Silvio Giuseppe Mercati (*Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, 3, 1931, pp. 231–245), nor in that given in his *Opere Minori* Vol. 5 [Studi e Testi 80], pp. 21–54. (Is

have been preserved a short Introduction to Logic in Syriac, addressed to Anûširwân,¹⁵) and a commentary on De Interpretatione, also in Syriac.¹⁶) The entire second part of Miskawaih's *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt*, as outlined above constitutes yet a third work by Paul, hitherto unknown. This contention has now to be demonstrated.

Pines claims that "the fact that the classification of sciences which follows immediately upon the quotation which has been translated [i.e., the entire second paragraph of Paul's text translated in the present paper, above], differs from the classification found in Paul's treatise on logic

Altheim copying Baumstark's oversight without himself having seen Mercati's article?) Altheim, finally, like Kraus before him, makes the same point about the similarity between Burzōe's introduction to the *Kalīla wa-Dimna* and Paul's Introduction to Logic (see what next follows) without, however, referring to Kraus's article.

The exact identity and dates of Paul the Persian are questions that have yet to be resolved. The problem is that in the sources we find mentioned *four* Paul the Persian's, who may, or may not, be all the same person: i) a "Christian Paul the Persian" (Παύλου τοῦ Πέρσου τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ) who participated in a debate (διάλεχος) and defense (ἀπολογία) against Manichaeism (Patrologia Graeca Vol. 88, coll. 529–578); ii) a "Paul the Persian from Nisibis" (Paulum nomine, Persam genere . . . in Nisibi . . . edoctus) whose work was adapted by Junilius Africanus in the latter's *Instituta Regularia Divinae Legis* (Patrologia Latina Vol. 68, coll. 15 ff.); iii) Paul of Nisibis (Baumstark, *Geschichte*, pp. 120 f.); and iv) Paul the Persian, the author of the Syriac Introduction to Logic (and other works current in the Syriac tradition, as we shall see below). Mercati seems inclined to identify the first three and even the fourth (p. 182 and note 2; also cf. Mercati's references to Kihn); Baumstark, on the other hand, implies that there are three different persons: (i) and (ii), Paul of Nisibis, and Paul the Persian (pp. 121, 246). This problem requires a separate investigation that cannot be undertaken here. In what follows I will be talking only of Paul, the author of the Syriac Introduction to Logic.

¹⁵) Edited and translated into Latin by J. P. N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca IV*, Leiden 1875, pp. 1–32 (text), pp. 1–30 (translation). In the unique MS in which this work has been preserved (Brit. Mus. Add. 14660), it follows immediately upon works by Severus Šēḫōkt who, according to the Bedjan MS (see following note), translated Paul's commentary on De Interpretatione from Pehlevī into Syriac. For this reason Baumstark (*Geschichte*, p. 246 and note 8) thinks that it is quite certain that the Introduction to Logic also was initially composed in Pehlevī.

¹⁶) In MS Bedjan, pp. 124–155: A. Van Hoonacker, *Le Traité du philosophe Syrien Probus sur les Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote*, in: *Journal Asiatique*, Ser. 9, XVI.1, 1900, p. 73; and in MS No. 50 Sup., Couvent de Notre-Dame des Séminces: Kh. Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions Syro-Arabes*, Beyrut 1948, p. 25. The Bedjan MS says that this work was translated from Pehlevī into Syriac by Severus Šēḫōkt. Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 246. See also below, note 29.

is a reason for believing that the quotation in Kitâb al-Sa'âda ends at the point referred to above [i.e., with the words, 'the diseases of ignorance'].¹⁷⁾ It is true that the classification found in Miskawaih's text is different from that given by Paul in his Introduction to Logic,¹⁸⁾ but this by no means implies that the two authors have to be necessarily different. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Alexandrian prolegomena to the study of Aristotle, from which both classifications derive.¹⁹⁾

In the extremely scholastic curriculum of higher studies in the last period of Alexandrian scholarship (5th–6th centuries), before one could even begin to study Aristotle's *Categoriae*, traditionally the first book of logic to be covered, one had to study the following prolegomena:²⁰⁾ 1) an introduction to philosophy in general, 2) an introduction to Porphyry's *Isagoge*, 3) Porphyry's *Isagoge*, with a commentary, 4) a general introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle, 5) a special introduction to the *Categoriae*, and finally, the *Categoriae* itself, with a commentary.²¹⁾ During the course of these prolegomena, a professor had *two* occasions to touch upon the classification of the parts of philosophy: one was in the introduction to philosophy in general (No. 1, above), and the other in the general introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle (No. 4). In the former instance, there was presented a brief division of philosophy into theoretical and practical – with the inevitable discussion on whether logic is a part or an instrument of philosophy – and the subdivisions of these two; in the latter, there was presented a detailed division of Aristotle's opus, with titles of his works serving as examples for each subdivision. This is exactly the case with the two classifications under discussion here: that found in Paul's Introduction to Logic is a division of philosophy *in general*, derived from an introduction to philosophy in general (= prolegomenon No. 1, above), and that found in

¹⁷⁾ Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh, p. 125. This problem is overlooked entirely by all the other authors mentioned in note 1, above.

¹⁸⁾ Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, pp. 4.25–5.19 (text), 5–6 (translation).

¹⁹⁾ In his brief notes, Land (pp. 99–113, especially p. 107) documented Paul's dependence on Alexandrian Aristotelianism as best as he could with the published material available at the time (1875); the C[ommentaria in] A[ristotelem] G[raeca] were yet to appear.

²⁰⁾ What F. E. Peters calls "the eisagoge complex": Aristotle and the Arabs, New York 1968, pp. 79–87.

²¹⁾ A good summary of this literature and bibliographical information are given by I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Göteborg 1957, pp. 444–456. A more detailed outline of these prolegomena is sketched by L. G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, Amsterdam 1962, pp. xxv–xxxii.

Miskawaih's *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt* is a division of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy, derived from a general introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle (prolegomenon No. 4) [see Diagrams Ic and III]. The fact that the two classifications are different, therefore, in no way invalidates the assumption of a single author for both of them.

An extant complete course of prolegomena in Greek by a single author,²²⁾ Elias,²³⁾ provides both an attestation to this and the mediate source of the classifications in Paul's Introduction to Logic and in Miskawaih's text. In his prolegomenon No. 1 Elias presents a division of philosophy in general (CAG XVIII.i, 26.6–29.8) [see Diagram Ia], and in his prolegomenon No. 4 he offers us the most elaborate extant classification of Aristotle's work (CAG XVIII.i, 113.17–116.28) [see Diagram II]. His former division has no significant distinguishing characteristics and is, details apart, the same as that given by the other Alexandrian commentators; his classification of Aristotle's works, however, is extraordinary because of two features, both of them *unique* to Elias and both of them reproduced in Miskawaih's text: one is the unprecedentedly detailed subdivision of Aristotle's physical works, and the other is his treatment of logic. The subdivisions of the physical treatises and their correspondence to the classification in Miskawaih's text, §§ III and XI, can be seen in Diagrams II and III and need not detain us here; his division of the parts of logic, however, and the corresponding sections in Miskawaih's text, §§ VII and X, deserve to be quoted in full [see also Diagram IV]:

²²⁾ I do not wish to insist unduly on the authorship of a single person in this connection. With regard to the commentaries of the Alexandrian scholars, ascriptions in the Greek manuscript tradition are notoriously misleading, and "we cannot therefore know for certain that this or that is the intellectual property of one of these professors" (Düring, 449). See, e.g., the informative discussion about Olympiodorus in L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo I: Olympiodorus*, Amsterdam 1976, pp. 20–27. On the other hand, precisely because of the quasi-communal nature of the lectures and their recording (ἀπὸ φωνῆς, i.e., notes taken by students attending), the exact identity of the commentator is not so important as the commentatorial *tradition* at a given moment of its development.

²³⁾ Fl. ca. 550. Biographical information about him is scanty. The most detailed discussion about his life and works is that by Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, pp. xx–xxiii (see also the bibliography quoted there). Elias's prolegomena were edited by A. Busse, CAG XVIII.i, Berlin 1900. The contents of this volume are: prolegomenon No. 1: pp. 1–34; No. 2: pp. 35–39; No. 3: pp. 40–104; No. 4: pp. 105–129.3; No. 5: pp. 129.4–134; commentary on the *Categoriae*: pp. 135–255. Another, and earlier, extant complete course of prolegomena is that by Ammonius, CAG IV.3 and 4.

Elias, CAG XVIII.i,
pp. 116.29–117.8

Logic is also divided into three: into what precedes the demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) or method, into the demonstration itself, and into what plays the role (ὑποδύεται)²⁴ of demonstration. The books which deal with what precedes the method and the demonstration are the *Categoriae*, *De Interpretatione*, and *Analytica Priora*; that which teaches the very method of demonstration is *Analytica Posteriora*; and those which play the role of demonstration itself are the *Topica*, *Rhetorica*, *Sophistici Elenchi*, and *Poetica*.

For there are five kinds of syllogisms: demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, and poetic – and rightly so (καὶ εἰχότως), because the propositions from which the syllogisms are derived are five: for either propositions are true in all respects (in which

Miskawaih, § X,
p. 68.2–6

Some of the syllogisms <lead to> the methods of demonstration, and others protect and defend it. The three [kinds of syllogisms] which stand at the beginning of the art are those which lead to it [i.e., the *Categoriae*, *De Interpretatione*, *Analytica Priora*]; the last four protect it against imitations²⁵ [i.e., *Topica*, *Sophistici Elenchi*, *Rhetorica*, *Poetica*]. The noblest of these books is *Analytica Posteriora* [*K. al-Burhân*] because it is the primary purpose [of logic].

Miskawaih § VII, 63.6–15

[See the end of this paragraph.]

The kinds of syllogisms and statements by means of which we seek to correct an opinion and arrive at the true solution of a problem that either we or some-

²⁴) It is interesting to compare Elias's description of the third part of logic with that of the other commentators. Elias shares the use of the theatrical term (ὑποδύεται) with Simplicius (CAG VIII, p. 4.31); Ammonius and Philoponus (CAG IV.4, p. 5.7–8, and XIII.i, p. 3.20–21, respectively) describe it as that part which contributes in different ways (ἄλλως συντελοῦντων) to the method; and Olympiodorus (CAG XII.i, p. 8.5) says that it cleanses, or purifies (καθαίρει) the method. Cf. the corresponding descriptions of Paul the Persian and al-Fârâbî in Diagrams IV and V.

²⁵) Tuḥāmî 'anhu [MS: 'alaihi] li-allâ yatašabbaha [MS: yaštabiha] bihi mâ laisa minhu.

Elias, CAG XVIII.i,
pp. 116,29–117.8

Miskawaih, § X,
p. 68.2–6

case they bring about the demonstrative syllogism), or they are false in all respects (in which case they bring about the poetic or literary (μυθώδη) syllogism), or else they are true in some respects and false in others. This again can happen in three ways: either the proposition is more true than false (in which case it brings about the dialectical syllogism), or it is more false than true (in which case it brings about the sophistical syllogism), or, finally, it is as false as it is true (in which case it brings about the rhetorical syllogism).

one else may have, are divided into three parts: either they are all undoubtedly true and certain, or they are all false, full of doubts, or else they are true in some respects and false in others. This last kind is divided into three parts: either it is more true than false, or it is more false than true, or else it is as false as it is true. All the kinds of syllogism thus become five: inducing certainty [demonstrative], inducing strong opinions [dialectical], inducing error [sophistical], persuasive [rhetorical], and inducing imaginary impressions [poetic].

Throughout the long history of Aristotelianism up to the time of Elias, both the classification of Aristotle's works and the different kinds of syllogisms had been discussed many times;²⁶) but they had never been presented in as systematic a manner as the one offered by Elias here. It is therefore striking to find both of these features, unique, as mentioned above, to Elias, faithfully reproduced in the classification of Aristotle's works found in Miskawaih's text, a fact which places the derivation of the latter from the Alexandrian tradition represented by Elias beyond dispute. Since, then, §§ III, VII, and X–XII in Miskawaih's text derive from this tradition, and since §§ IV–X correspond closely with al-Fârâbî's chapter on logic in the *Ihşâ' al-'ulûm* [see Table I], it will have to be assumed that either Miskawaih is drawing upon al-Fârâbî,²⁷) or else both are drawing

²⁶) For both these subjects, the fundamental study is that by P. Moraux, *Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951. For the inclusion of the *Rhetorica* and *Poetica* among the books of the *Organon*, see especially pp. 172–183. See also now his *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I* [Peripatoi 5], Berlin 1973, pp. 58–94.

²⁷) As Pines (Ahmad Miskawayh, p. 122) tends to believe; repeated in his Aristotle's *Politics* in *Arabic Philosophy*, in: *Israel Oriental Studies*, 5, 1975, p. 153.

upon a common source. The first alternative, however, would also require us to assume that a) for §§ IV–X, Miskawaih used al-Fârâbî, who himself must have used an Arabic translation of the division of logic presented by Elias, and b) for §§ III and XI–XII, sections not found in al-Fârâbî, Miskawaih used a different, unknown, source which derived, independently from the source used by al-Fârâbî in (a), also from Elias. But this is highly unlikely and unnecessarily complicated; besides, a number of arguments that can be adduced from internal evidence in the texts of Miskawaih and al-Fârâbî also tends to indicate that both of them used a common source, a source which Miskawaih copied rather faithfully and which al-Fârâbî adapted and edited.²⁸⁾ There can be thus little doubt that the entire second part of Miskawaih's *Tartīb as-sa'ādāt*, as outlined above, is an Arabic translation of an introductory work composed by Paul the Persian (in Pehlevî?)²⁹⁾ on the philosophy of Aristotle, modeled on the late Alexandrian prolegomena to Aristotle, and used both by al-Fârâbî and Miskawaih.

I mentioned above that the prolegomena of Elias serve as the mediate, not direct, source of Paul's treatise. First of all, this is evident from a comparison of the classification of Aristotle's works given by the two authors [see Diagrams II and III]. Paul's classification differs from that of Elias in the following respects: 1) the division of theoretical and practical philosophy, although ultimately into the same number of parts, is more elaborate in Paul, i.e., it goes through more subdivisions: both theoretical

²⁸⁾ See below, Nos. v and vi, and notes 61 and 65.

²⁹⁾ Since this treatise was addressed to Anûšîrwân, the real question is whether the Persian ruler knew any Syriac. This thorny problem has been much debated, and contradictory views have been held by different scholars as well as by single individuals: A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, Copenhagen ²1944, p. 427, note 4: "Nous pourrions supposer que le traité de Paulus a été traduit du syriaque en pehlvi, mais il n'est peut-être pas absolument invraisemblable que Khusrô ait su lire le syriaque;" Altheim, *Geschichte der Hunnen*, Vol. III, p. 89: "Schwerlich mochte sich Chusrô Anôšarvân das Syrische angeeignet haben;" Baumstark initially (*Lucubrationes Syro-Graecae*, in: *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Suppl. 21, 1894, p. 368) maintained that Paul's Introduction to Logic was composed in Syriac, but later (*Geschichte*, p. 246) changed his mind in favor of Pehlevî. He therefore does not deserve Tkatsch's criticism (*Poetik* I.74b). Most of this literature is rather dated, however, and the question needs to be examined anew. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume what the weight of the evidence indicates: that Paul's Introduction to Aristotle's works, as preserved in Miskawaih, was originally composed in Pehlevî (cf. notes 15 and 16, above), and that it passed into Arabic from a Syriac intermediary (the other two extant works by Paul are preserved in Syriac).

and practical philosophy are each first divided into two, and then each one of these subdivisions is further subdivided into two, to arrive finally at the same traditional tripartition, physics-mathematics-metaphysics and ethics-economics-politics, respectively; 2) the classification of the psychological treatises is radically different in Paul; 3) Paul omits altogether the classification of the treatises on sublunar physical events. For our purposes here, the significant difference is the first one,³⁰⁾ because it points to a development *within* the Alexandrian scholastic tradition, whose most representative characteristic was an increasing use of the method of division for the presentation of essentially the same material, as a brief comparison between the prolegomena of Ammonius (CAG IV.3 and 4) and Elias will immediately show.³¹⁾ This development reached its apogee with another late sixth century scholar, David,³²⁾ who uses the method of division *ad nauseam*. David would thus be a good candidate for serving as the more immediate source, if not *the* source, of Paul, whose contemporary, after all, he was. Unfortunately, of the five kinds of prolegomena mentioned above, we possess only Nos. 1 to 3 by David (CAG XVIII.2). We know nothing of a prolegomenon No. 4 by him, which would have included the classification of Aristotle's works and thus enabled us to compare it with Paul's classification. On the other hand, David's treatment of philosophy in general in his prolegomenon No. 1 corresponds so closely with the parallel passage in Paul's Introduction to Logic,³³⁾ that David's candidacy as *the* source of Paul becomes much more probable. Paul's tripartition of theoretical philosophy [Diagram Ic] is certainly, in its broad outline, common to the entire Alexandrian tradition; specifically, however, his citing soul, gods, and angels (*naḥšā, šēdē, malāḳē*) as examples of intelligible entities (which he calls invisible, *lā meḥāzyānē*), and his summary

³⁰⁾ The omission of the treatises on sublunar physical events may be accidental, whereas the different classification of the psychological treatises constitutes a break with the Alexandrian Aristotelian tradition and is more closely related to the platonizing tendencies of the Athenian school as represented by Simplicius (on this whole issue see M. Guidi and R. Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindī I*, Rome 1940, pp. 378–380, and especially the fundamental discussion in Ph. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, The Hague ³1968, pp. 59–87). Paul's preference in this regard for the platonizing tradition may be due to his theological background.

³¹⁾ See the comparative outline in Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, pp. xxvi–xxxii.

³²⁾ "David is even less known than Elias:" Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, pp. xxiii–xxiv, with supplementary information by the same author in his *Pseudo-Elias*, Amsterdam 1967, pp. xv–xvi.

³³⁾ See above, note 18.

description of natural things as those which come into being and pass away (*dbahwāyā whubbālā*) are dependent directly on David. For David alone, among the Greek commentators whose work is extant, both cites in this context angel, god, and soul (ἄγγελος, θεός, ψυχή) as examples of the invisible (ἀόρατα) theological objects of theoretical philosophy, and describes the natural object (τὸ φυσιολογικόν) as that which is constantly in flow and ebb, being always in different states (ἀεὶ ἐν ῥοῇ καὶ ἀπορροῇ ὄν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχον).³⁴ If Paul, then, is so dependent on David for material drawn from prolegomenon No. 1, it is reasonable to assume that he might have derived his material for the classification of Aristotle's works (prolegomenon No. 4) also from David, especially since the increased use of division in classification which we witnessed in Paul is David's most characteristic method of presentation. Furthermore, in the absence of a prolegomenon No. 4 by David, we may even assume its existence on the basis of the evidence provided by Paul. The latest stage of Alexandrian Aristotelian prolegomena as represented by David, therefore, was the major source used by Paul in the composition of his treatises.

It may not be idle at this point to look at the extant works of Paul as a whole and to try to revive the discussion about his significance. What we have of his works,³⁵ first of all, falls into two categories: to the first belongs his Introduction to Logic, which is an epitome of that part of the Organon which was studied in the Syriac school tradition, i.e., Porphyry's Isagoge through the *Analytica Priora* I.7,³⁶ prefaced by Paul's own introduction and prolegomenon No. 1 of the Alexandrian tradition; to the second belong a) his Introduction to Aristotle's works, as preserved in Miskawaih, which is, as we saw above, prolegomenon No. 4 of the Alexandrian tradition (cf. Table I), and b) his commentary on *De Interpretatione*. As prolegomenon No. 4 traditionally constituted the first part of a commentary on the *Categoriae*, it may not be entirely unfounded to assume that the second category of Paul's works consisted of extensive commentaries on the Organon, after the fashion of the Alexandrian commentators. This hypothesis may or may not prove to be true, but there is sufficient reason, I believe, for future research not to overlook it.

Secondly, it is significant that both the Introduction to Logic and the Introduction to Aristotle's works were addressed to Ḥusrau Anūšīrwān. The liberal (or perhaps, deliberately indulgent?) intellectual atmosphere prevailing at this ruler's court has been repeatedly described, both in

³⁴) David, CAG XVIII.ii, pp. 58.5 and 59.28–31.

³⁵) I.e., the works transmitted in the Syriac tradition (above, note 14).

³⁶) As already indicated by Land, p. 103. See below, note 40.

ancient sources and modern scholarship, usually with the highest words of praise;³⁷⁾ we need here to look at the issues raised by Paul's contribution to it with a view to later developments in Islam, now that at least one of his works has been shown to have been translated into Arabic.

Undoubtedly the most important point made by Paul in his Introduction to Logic is his statement that knowledge (*ida'tā*) is better than belief (*haimānūtā*). Paul starts his argument with the relativity of religious belief and the variety of opinions resulting therefrom, to arrive at this conclusion by way of the *objects* of knowledge and belief. He says, in effect, "The objects of knowledge are near, manifest, and can be known; those of belief, on the other hand, are distant, invisible, and cannot be known exactly (*lā metyaḍ'ān bhattitūtā*). The latter are doubtful, the former not so . . . Knowledge is therefore better than belief . . ." (Land, p. 2.26-3.2). Paul then goes on to say that knowledge is provided by philosophy, the instrument of which is logic. This type of argumentation, which establishes the objects of knowledge and belief as criteria for their respective worth, again recalls the classification of the objects of philosophy effected by the Alexandrian commentators. As a matter of fact, David once more provides the clue for an understanding of Paul's passage. In the same prolegomenon of David (No. 1) from which Paul derived his division of philosophy in general, David analyzes the objects of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, and says that of these three, only the objects of mathematics are subject to exact knowledge (*ἀκριβεῖ γνῶσει*): the natural object cannot be known exactly because it is in constant flux, and "the divine objects, in so far as they are, indeed, invisible and ungraspable, are known through representation rather than exact knowledge."³⁸⁾ Mathematics, therefore, teaches us

³⁷⁾ A concise but particularly pithy assessment by Kraus, Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa', pp. 14-20; comprehensive accounts in Altheim, *Geschichte der Hunnen*, III.85-94, and especially Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, pp. 415-440. For ancient reports see Th. Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden*, Leiden 1879, pp. 160-2, and especially 160, note 2. One of the earliest Muslim reports is that by Abū Sahl al-Faḍl b. Naubaht (d. ca. 200/815), *Fihrist* 238f. (Flügel), especially p. 239.29-30 (first noted and translated by C. A. Nallino, *Tracce di opere greche giunte agli Arabi per trafila Pehlevica*, in: *A Volume of Oriental Studies Presented to E. G. Browne*, Cambridge 1922, p. 363), with echoes from the *Dēnkart* (cf. Pines, Ahmad Miskawayh, pp. 125-129).

³⁸⁾ CAG XVIII.ii, p. 59.31-32: τὰ θεῖα ἅτε δὴ ἀόρατα ὄντα καὶ ἀκατάληπτα, εἰσασμῷ μᾶλλον γινώσκονται ἢ περ ἀκριβεῖ γνῶσει. The theory of knowledge adumbrated in this passage is paralleled in only two of the other extant commentaries: Elias (CAG XVIII.i, p. 28.27-8): ταῦτα [scil. μαθηματικά] γὰρ μανθάνομεν ἀκριβῶς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα [scil. φυσικά, θεολογικά] εἰκάζομεν μᾶλλον ἢ μανθάνομεν and Ps.-Elias (Westerink, Pseudo-Elias, p. 35.32): τὰ γὰρ φύσει . . . οὐκ ἀκριβῶς διὰ μαθήσεως

how we should investigate things; even Aristotle, who teaches us the same thing in his logic, used mathematics as his starting-point. The tenor of the two arguments by David and Paul is certainly different, but their correspondence cannot be fortuitous. David does not mention belief explicitly, but there is little doubt that the way of knowledge through representation actually refers to belief. Paul brings the issue out into the open: precisely *because* the divine objects are invisible and “ungraspable,” belief, the way of knowing them, is inferior to certain knowledge. He then reaffirms the importance of logic as *the* epistemological tool, passing over in silence David’s rather disparaging comment (i.e., Aristotle used mathematics as his starting point for logic).

The discussion about logic also constitutes the largest and most important part of Paul’s Introduction to Aristotle’s works. Noteworthy features of this discussion are the comparison of logic to grammar and prosody (§ V of the outline above),³⁹) and the binary classification of the parts of the *Organon* according to the analytic and synthetic approaches (§§ VIII–IX of the outline above; see Diagram IVb), adapted and elabo-

γινώσκονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις καὶ στοχασμῷ τινὶ γινώσκονται· τὰ δὲ θεῖα πάλιν οὐ μαθήσει ἀλλ’ εἰκασίᾳ τινὶ μανθάνομεν· ταῦτα δὲ μόνον μανθάνομεν τὰ μαθηματικὰ λεγόμενα [emphasis added]. All three commentaries derive from the same late sixth century Alexandrian tradition. The significance of the theory of knowledge implied in these passages needs to be emphasized: behind the word εἰκασίᾳ (representation) there seems to lie the entire tradition of *allegorical* interpretation of sacred texts (whether pagan or Christian), as practised from the earliest Hellenistic times down through Neoplatonism. By the time of Olympiodorus, the immediate predecessor of the authors of these passages, an accommodation was effected between philosophy and religion with regard to their respective place in the scale of knowledge: Olympiodorus himself “seems to have accepted Christianity at least as a creed for the uneducated” (Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, p. xix). In the passages quoted above we witness a *translation* of this accommodation into philosophical terms, and its *incorporation* into the Aristotelian curriculum. From these prolegomena it could easily find its way into the Syriac tradition and hence into Arabic, where we find it fully developed in al-Fârâbî (especially in his *Mabâdî’ arâ’ ahl al-madîna al-fâdila* – cf. R. Walzer in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1970, pp. 654–657) and in Ibn Rušd (especially in his *Faṣl al-maqâl* – cf. G. F. Hourani, *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* [Gibb Memorial Series, N.S. 21], London 1967, pp. 22–28).

³⁹) On this subject see G. Endress, *The Debate between Arabic Grammar and Greek Logic in Classical Islamic Thought*, in: *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* (Aleppo), 1/ii, 1977, pp. 320–322 and 351–339, and 2/i, 1978, pp. 192–181. I wish to thank Prof. Dr. Endress for kindly drawing my attention to these publications.

rated from Elias(-David). But the center of gravity of Paul's treatise is by far the preeminence accorded to the *Analytica Posteriora*, and its description as the "noblest" (*ašraf*) of the books of the *Organon* (§ X of the outline). Although this feature as well is borrowed from Elias(-David) (the description "noblest" seems to be Paul's), the very fact that it is borrowed is significant: in the Syriac school tradition, the *Analytica Posteriora* was not studied lest it conflict with revealed religion.⁴⁰) Paul's drawing attention to the *Analytica Posteriora*, which alone provides certain knowledge, thus well accords with his preference of knowledge over belief in his Introduction to Logic.

This is not the place to delve more deeply into the problem of knowledge versus belief or to discuss the antecedents of this debate in Greek theological literature, with which Paul was undoubtedly familiar. Our main interest has been to adumbrate the development of this debate *within* the philosophical tradition of the Alexandrian commentators, to which Paul belonged. In this tradition, the problem of knowledge versus belief must have occupied an increasingly central position with the gradual Christianization of the Alexandrian scholars,⁴¹) but it seems never to have been made explicit and to have been referred to only obliquely, as in the passage of David quoted above. This reticence was partly due to the sclerotic effect of the traditionally established subjects for discussion, and partly to social and religious constraints. At the court of Anūšīrwān where Paul was active, however, the weight of tradition and these constraints were evidently not present,⁴²) and Paul could thus raise the issue openly and point to the epistemological importance of the *Analytica Posteriora*. In all this, and in

⁴⁰) This information is primarily derived from al-Fārābī's treatise on the origins of philosophy (*ap.* Ibn Abī Ušaiḥ'a II.135.12 (Müller), see below, note 58; see also R. Walzer, *New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle*, in: *Oriens*, 6, 1953, p. 129 [repr. in: *Greek into Arabic*, Cambridge (Harvard U.P.) 1962, p. 98]), and corroborated by the extant Syriac MSS of the *Organon*: see M. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen*, in: *Beihefte zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, 12, 1893, p. 41 [repr. Graz 1960, p. 79], and A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern*, Leipzig 1900 [repr. Aalen 1975], pp. 139–148 on *Prōhā*. Paul himself, in his Introduction to Logic, apparently following tradition, stops with *Analytica Priora* I.7.

⁴¹) The tensions between paganism and Christianity in the Alexandrian school since the days of Hermias have been succinctly described, on the basis of the occasional comments of the scholars, by Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena*, pp. x–xxv. Cf. also M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad*, in *Sitz. d. Berl. Akad.*, *Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, 1930, pp. 399f.

⁴²) See note 37, above.

the fact that he converted to Zoroastrianism,⁴³⁾ Paul was somewhat of a maverick, which may well explain the scant references to him in the Syriac tradition, and hence in Arabic as well. But his works were read⁴⁴⁾ and one of them at least was translated into Arabic.

II. *The Translation and the Translator of Paul's Introduction to Aristotle's Works*

The faithfulness of this translation, as we now have it in the text of Miskawaih, is difficult to judge. The Arabic is smooth, and Miskawaih may or may not have made editorial intrusions, although there are indications that he did not.^{44a)} On the other hand, the text contains a number of glosses⁴⁵⁾ which were inserted, in all probability, by the translator and which were designed to update Paul's text in order to increase its usefulness in the different audience to which it was now being addressed. These glosses provide valuable information on many counts:

a) The famous etymology of *sūfistā'īya* (§ VIIIa), as compared to that in al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*, reads as follows:

⁴³⁾ See the references above, note 14. There has been a continuous tendency among scholars to doubt the veracity of this report: from Wright (*A Short History of Syriac Literature*, London 1894, p. 122) through Brockelmann (*Die syrische und die christlich-arabische Litteratur*, in: *Geschichte der christlichen Litteraturen des Orients*, Leipzig 1907, p. 41) to Pines (*Ahmad Miskawayh*, p. 124), but no arguments in support of this doubt have ever been brought forward. As the occurrence of this report in the Chronicle of Se'ert indicates, it must have been current in the Nestorian tradition, and for the moment, at least, we cannot detect any motivation in this tradition for accusing Paul falsely of apostasy.

⁴⁴⁾ Barhebraeus apparently used Paul's Introduction to Logic quite extensively, and he seems even to have borrowed one of his titles from that work: H. F. Janssens, *Bar Hebraeus' Book of the Pupils of the Eye*, I, in: *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, 47, 1930-31, pp. 26, 43. See also the same author's *L'Entretien de la Sagesse*, Liège-Paris 1937, index s.v. Paul le Perse. Furthermore, the very fact that Paul's commentary on *De Interpretatione* (and his other works also? see above, notes 15, 16, 29) was translated from Pehlevī into Syriac is indication enough that there was interest in him in the Syriac tradition.

^{44a)} See below in this section. It also seems that, as a rule, Miskawaih did not tamper with his written sources. An independent test case is provided by Arberry's discovery of al-Ḥasan b. Sahl's *Jāvidān Hiraq* which Miskawaih copied quite faithfully in his own *Ādāb al-'Arab wa-l-Furs* (*Journal of Semitic Studies*, 8, 1963, p. 158).

⁴⁵⁾ In the outline above, pp. 234 f., §§ VIIIa, VIIIb, XIa, XIIa, XIIIa. These glosses are not designated as such, but they are obvious interpolations of the translator into Arabic.

Paul the Persian

In the Greek language, the etymon (*muštaqq*) of *sūfistā'īya* is *swf*, i.e., wisdom, and *'stys*, i.e., obfuscating (*talbīs*) and misrepresenting (*tamwīh*) It is not true, as the Muslim theologians (*mutakallimā*⁴⁶) *l-Islām*) believe, that there was in antiquity a man called Sūfistā

al-Fārābī, Amīn 81.6–9⁴⁷)

In Greek, the components (*murakkab*)⁴⁸) of *sūfistā'īya* are *swfy*, i.e., wisdom, and *'stys*, i.e., misrepresenting (*tamwīh*; *sic lege*)⁴⁹) ... It is not true, as some people (*qaumun*) believe, that Sūfistā is the name of a man who lived in antiquity ...

Several conclusions can be drawn from these passages: i) Miskawaih cannot be considered the author of this editorial gloss. Were he the author, it is unlikely that he would refer to the Muslim theologians as *mutakallimā l-Islām*; *al-mutakallimān* by itself would have sufficed. ii) The fact that Miskawaih retains the word *Islām* indicates that in this instance, and perhaps as a rule throughout the second part of his work, he is faithfully copying the Arabic translation of Paul's text. By the same token, iii) Miskawaih cannot be the translator of Paul's work, if one were to assume that he had access to the alleged Pehlevī original, and iv) the author of this gloss, the translator, could not have been a Muslim. Furthermore, the derogatory comment about the *mutakallimān*, which highlights their ignorance about something basic and simple, indicates a certain amount of disdain in which they were held by the translator. v) al-Fārābī's substitution of the innocuous 'some people' (*qaum*)⁵⁰) for the 'Muslim theologians' lends credence to the point just made (iv); it also provides corroboration for the conclusion reached above, namely, that both al-Fārābī and Miskawaih used a common source rather than that the latter drew upon the former: for had Miskawaih borrowed his material directly from al-Fārābī, it is difficult to imagine that he would have substituted 'the Muslim theologians' for 'some

⁴⁶) Thus in the Cairo MS; not *muslimā* [!] *l-Islām*, as in the printed ed.

⁴⁷) al-Fārābī gives the same etymology in the short introductory piece on logic in the MS Hamidiye 812: D. M. Dunlop, Al-Fārābī's Introductory *Risālah* on Logic, in: *Islamic Quarterly*, 3, 1956–57, p. 226.16.

⁴⁸) In the Hamidiye MS *Risālah*, however, al-Fārābī does use the word *īštaqqa* in this connection (Dunlop 226.14)

⁴⁹) As in the Escorial MS (G. Palencia's ed.), corroborated by the text of Paul and the reading in the Hamidiye MS (Dunlop 226.14).

⁵⁰) In his *al-Alfāz al-musta'mala fī l-mantiq* (ed. M. Mahdi, Beirut 1968, p. 105), and in the same context, al-Fārābī again does not identify these people.

people.' vi) The same conclusion is further corroborated by the slight divergence in the etymology of *sūfistā'iya* given by the two authors: the translator of Paul's text analyzes correctly the word into its component parts, the root *sof*- (*swf*) and the suffix *-ιστης* (*'stys*). al-Fārābī, knowing from the etymologies of the word philosophy (*fyl'swfy*) current in his time, such as the one given by his younger contemporary al-Ḥwārizmī, that the Greek word for 'wisdom' is not *sof* (*swf*) but *σοφία* (*swfy*), tries to "correct" the etymology in Paul's text and thus substitutes the latter for the former.⁵¹) Again, had Miskawaih borrowed his material from al-Fārābī, there is no reason why he should have changed the word *swfy* in al-Fārābī's text into the word *swf* which we find in his.

b) In another comment by the translator, we read (in § VIIIb) the following about the *Analytica* (*K. al-Qiyās*): "This book is found in the old translation (*fī n-naql al-qadīm*) in two parts: one is the *K. al-Qiyās* and the other the *K. al-Burhān*. In Greek, it is called *Analytica Priora* and *Analytica Posteriora*." The key phrase in this quotation is "the old translation," which helps us establish the approximate dates of the translator. This phrase was one of the philological technical terms used by the scholars in the 10th-11th century philosophical school of Bagdād to refer to transla-

⁵¹) Al-Ḥwārizmī's (*Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm*, p. 131, van Vloten) exact wording is interesting in this connection: al-falsafatu muštaqqatun min kalimatin Yūnānīyatin, wa-hiya fyl'swfy', wa-tafsīruhā maḥabbatu l-ḥikma; fa-lammā u'ribat qīla failasūf, tumma štuqqat al-falsafatu minhā. If al-Fārābī were thinking along these lines, he could have very well taken the word *swf* in Paul's text to be a corruption from *swfy*, caused by the *-sūf* in *failasūf*, and he therefore undertook to "correct" it. This analysis takes the hard line in implying that al-Fārābī knew no Greek, contra al-Ḥaṭṭābī, *op. M. Mahdi*, article al-Fārābī, in: *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, New York 1970-6, IV.523 f. (Similar, and independently substantiated, doubts on the accuracy of al-Ḥaṭṭābī's report are cast by Grignaschi, in J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi, *Al-Fārābī: Deux ouvrages inédits sur la Rhétorique [sic]*, Beirut 1971, p. 136 and note 2. Cf. the earlier opinion of F. Rosenthal, *On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World*, in: *Islamic Culture*, 14, 1940, p. 410 and note 7.) This, however, need not be the case; it can also — but less plausibly, I think — be assumed that al-Fārābī substituted *swfy* for *swf* knowing full well the difference between the two, but because he was writing an expository work (the *Iḥṣā'*) and not a philological tract, he preferred to give for the word 'wisdom' the full Greek noun, *σοφία*, rather than the root *sof*- alone. However that may be, the point intended here stands, namely, that in the Arabic translation of Paul's work the reading was *swf* (which, after all, is the correct etymon), and that this reading was copied faithfully by Miskawaih but altered by al-Fārābī. The indication, therefore, is that Miskawaih did not copy al-Fārābī but that both drew upon a common source.

tions done before the time of Ḥunain b. Ishāq,⁵²⁾ the so-called *veteres*.⁵³⁾ The translator, therefore, in all probability belonged to this school; and since the translation of Paul's treatise was available to al-Fārābī, who died in 950 AD, the translator must have been one of the earliest members of this school. The date of translation thus falls approximately in the first half of the 4th/10th century.

c) The remaining editorial notes by the translator (§§ XIa, XIIa, XIIIa), although important in themselves for the light which they throw on the translations of Aristotle's works into Arabic,⁵⁴⁾ do not contribute anything to our discussion here.

The identity of the translator cannot be ascertained beyond the limits described above at the present state of our knowledge. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence, however, to prompt me to hazard a guess. The particulars of this evidence are the following: a) the polemic nature of the translator's comment about the ignorance of the Muslim theologians concerning the etymology of *ṣūfistā'iya*; b) the high degree of probability that the translator was an older member of the philosophical school in Baḡdād; c) the preeminence accorded to the *Analytica Posteriora* in Paul's treatise, i.e., the work translated, which may point to a similar interest on

⁵²⁾ Ibn an-Nadīm uses this expression a number of times for the same purpose in his *Fihrist* (I.248–252, Flügel), and we know that he used the notes of his contemporary Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, himself a member of the Baḡdād school, for a good part of his bibliographical information on the Aristotelian corpus (cf. G. Endress, Yaḥyā b. 'Adī, pp. 6 f.). The same expression is used by members of this school in the marginal glosses of the Paris MS of the *Organon* (Ar. 2346; cf. R. Walzer, *New Light*, pp. 113 and 125 [repr. Greek into Arabic, pp. 82 and 94]). As a matter of fact, the first marginal note on the *Analytica Priora* in the Paris MS also refers to the problem of the bipartition of the *Analytica*: wa-ka-annahu [scil. Aristotle] ḡama'a ḥādā l-kitāba [i.e., al-Qiyās] wa-kitāba l-Burhān wa-ṣayyarahū miṭla kitābin wāhid ('A. Badawī, *Manṭiq Aristū*, Cairo 1948, p. I.103). That this philological note was a commonplace in the Baḡdād school, and much older than the Paris MS, is indicated by al-Fārābī, himself associated with the school, who repeats it in his *Alfāz* (p. 106.8, Mahdi): wa-Aristātālīs kaṭṭran mā ya'uddu K. al-Qiyāsi wa-K. al-Burhāni ḡamī'an kitāban wāhidan. By contradistinction, Ḥunain b. Ishāq never once uses the expression *fī n-naql al-qadīm* in his bibliography of the Galenic corpus, despite the fact that he is discussing exclusively old and new translations (G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen* [AKM XVII.2], Leipzig 1925.) Ḥunain does not even use the word *naql* for translation, but only *tarḡama*, with the sole exception on p. 24.4 (Arabic text).

⁵³⁾ F. E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs*, p. 60.

⁵⁴⁾ Of these notes, § XIIa has been used by Pines in his study, *Aristotle's Politics* (above, note 27).

the part of the translator; d) al-Fārābī's faithful adaptation of the part on logic in his *Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm*, which may indicate a special relationship between al-Fārābī and the translator. All of the above items point to one man, Abū Bišr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940): a) he was the protagonist in the celebrated debate (320/932) with the Muslim theologian Abū Sa'īd as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) on the respective merits of grammar and logic;⁵⁵) b) he was, in effect, the founder of the philosophical school in Baǧdād; c) he was the first ever to translate the *Analytica Posteriora* into Arabic (he also translated Themistius' and his own teacher's, Abū Yahyā al-Marwazī's, commentaries on the same work); and finally, d) he was one of al-Fārābī's teachers.⁵⁶)

It is unnecessary to belabor the point beyond these indications in the absence of hard evidence. The fact remains, however, that the questions of philosophy versus religion and their respective methods, logic versus grammar, were intensely argued, for whatever reasons, in early fourth/tenth century Baǧdād, as the Abū Bišr Mattā – as-Sīrāfī debate indicates.⁵⁷) The Nestorian philosopher, in need of ammunition, dipped into his own

⁵⁵) See now the exhaustive study of this debate by M. Mahdi, *Language and Logic in Classical Islam*, in: *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, G. E. von Grunebaum, ed. [G. L. Della Vida Conf. I], Wiesbaden 1970, pp. 51–83.

⁵⁶) References to Abū Bišr Mattā can be found in N. Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic*, Pittsburgh 1964, pp. 119–122.

⁵⁷) The period during which Paul's treatise was translated into Arabic (approximately the first half of the fourth/tenth century) was one of intense political upheavals in Baǧdād. How this political situation affected and shaped the intellectual climate has yet to be studied in detail; in broad outline, though, it is apparent that the dominant ideological tendency was one of conservatism and intolerance, and that the period was one of retrenchment and consolidation. Certain events, which stand in sharp contrast to those of the preceding century, point unmistakably toward this direction: a series of executions of Šūfī's charged with heresy, notably al-Hallāǧ (309/922) and his disciples Haykal (309/922) and Šākir (311/924); executions of others, also charged with heresy: the littérateur Ibn Abī 'Aun (322/933) and the 'heretic' leader aš-Šalmaǧānī (322/933), whose follower Ibn Abī 'Aun was; persecution and forced conversion to Islam of the Šābians of Ḥarrān, among whom was the famous Sinān b. Tābit, during the reign of the caliph al-Qāhir (320/932–322/934). Seen against the background of such contemporary events, the Abū Bišr Mattā – as-Sīrāfī debate appears also as another battle, fought on the ideological plane, in the continuing war between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in Baǧdādī society. At stake was nothing less than the safeguarding of the traditional knowledge, i.e., religion, and the traditional way of examining that knowledge, grammar and philology, against a different, foreign kind of knowledge, philosophy, and its instrument, logic.

tradition and found the same issues discussed in the works of Paul the Persian, as we saw above. There could hardly be a more appropriate occasion for a work to be translated into Arabic.

III. *The Significance for al-Fârâbî*

al-Fârâbî models the entire chapter on logic in his *Ihşâ' al-'ulûm* upon the corresponding section of Paul's Introduction to Aristotle's works (Table I), which, in turn, is directly derived from the prolegomena to the study of Aristotle by Elias(-David). In this fashion, al-Fârâbî's connection with the last stages of Alexandrian Aristotelianism, via the Nestorian Syriac tradition as represented by Paul the Persian and, most probably, Abû Bişr Mattâ, is concretely established. It has long been known that the branches of al-Fârâbî's philosophy had their roots, through the trunk of the Syriac tradition, in the soil of Alexandrian philosophy; our source for this information is none other than al-Fârâbî himself.⁵⁸⁾ Recent scholarship has provided much discrete evidence in support of the pedigree claimed by al-Fârâbî;⁵⁹⁾ with Paul's treatise we are now in possession of both a specific link between al-Fârâbî and Alexandria, and a concrete text illustrating the connection.

Much benefit will accrue to research on al-Fârâbî from a detailed study of Paul's treatise, not the least of which will be a better text of Chapter II of the *Ihşâ' al-'ulûm*,⁶⁰⁾ and a deeper appreciation of al-Fârâbî's method of

⁵⁸⁾ In the fragment of his otherwise lost treatise on the origins and transmission of philosophy, preserved by Ibn Abî Uşaiḥ'a, II.134.30-135.24 (Müller). For the numerous studies of this text see, most recently, N. Rescher, *al-Fârâbî on Logical Tradition*, in: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 24, 1963, pp. 127-132, repr. in his *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*, Pittsburgh 1963, pp. 21-27. German and English translations of the passage in F. Rosenthal, *Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam*, Zürich-Stuttgart 1965, pp. 74-76 = *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1975, pp. 50f.

⁵⁹⁾ See R. Walzer's summary of his own research in his article *al-Fârâbî in EI²*, Vol. II, coll. 779a (top), 779b (bottom), 780a (middle). In a recent article, F. W. Zimmermann has shed much light on certain details of this transmission from late Alexandrian Aristotelianism through the Syriac tradition to al-Fârâbî: *Some Observations on al-Fârâbî and Logical Tradition*, in: *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* [Festschrift R. Walzer], eds. S. M. Stern, A. Hourani, V. Brown, Oxford 1972, pp. 517-546.

⁶⁰⁾ The sad state of G. Palencia's edition was noted by P. Kraus in his review in *Der Islam*, 22, 1935, pp. 82-85. Amīn's revised edition (1949 and 1968) is better, but it also needs improvement.

composition through a comparison of the two texts.⁶¹) Here I would like to call attention to one important aspect of Paul's treatise, which, in view of the observations made above about Paul and Abû Bišr Mattâ, may have wider implications for the thought of al-Fârâbî.

Classification by division was once for all established by Plato's dialogues as one of the pillars of Greek scientific method. In the case of the late Alexandrian scholars, it dominated their every intellectual endeavor. The immensely significant characteristic of the method of classification in this period is its dual function, one descriptive and epistemological, the other normative and ontological. In other words, when the subject under discussion was divided into its component parts, this division did not merely describe the subject as it appeared and hence facilitate its comprehension, but it also presumed to reflect its real nature, its ontological status. Thus, for example, after David had divided philosophy into two, theoretical and practical, he went on to "prove" why it is divided into two parts only and not into more.⁶²) The implication here is that philosophy is divided into two not because this or that philosopher so divided it, or because we choose so to divide it for the purposes of instruction or description, but because philosophy, inherently and by its very nature, can be *only* thus divided.

This dual function of classification by division is amply evident in Elias' division of logic, in the passage translated above. Elias first gives a descriptive division of logic (see also Diagram IVa), and then justifies this division by having recourse to a normative argument. He says, to quote him again, "For there are five kinds of syllogisms . . . — and *rightly so*, because the propositions from which the syllogisms are derived are five . . . [emphasis added]." The two words *καὶ εἰκότως* (and rightly, naturally, or properly so) help him cross imperceptibly from the descriptive to the normative: they conceal an entire host of assumptions and axiomatic

⁶¹) Even a cursory glance at the second of the two parallel texts by Paul and al-Fârâbî quoted above demonstrates the ways in which al-Fârâbî adapts and elaborates the received text: he provides explanatory details (the indefinite *taṣdîqan mâ* in Paul is explained by al-Fârâbî as *immâ ad'afa wa-immâ aqwâ*), he renders unclear expressions more intelligible (*iqnâ'u mâ* in Paul becomes *iqnâ'u l-insân* in al-Fârâbî), etc. I think that such considerations of textual comparison alone are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the text in Miskawaih (i.e., Paul) is prior and that al-Fârâbî drew from it, rather than the other way around.

⁶²) CAG XVIII.ii, pp. 55f. The entire prolegomena of David — or, for that matter, most of the writings of the Alexandrian commentators — are replete with such normative discussions. I am not aware of any study of the development of this kind of argumentation.

beliefs, culturally and traditionally determined, governing his philosophical *modus operandi*.

Paul the Persian, who reproduces Elias' division of logic, is quick to identify the dual function of this classification and state it in explicit terms: the descriptive division he calls synthetic (*tarkīb*), and the normative analytic (*tahlīl*). Paul is therefore one of the significant connecting links through whom there pass to Islamic civilization in general, and to al-Fārābī in particular, not only the mere technique of classification by division as a method of research, but also an awareness of its normative function.⁶³) al-Fārābī, who repeatedly uses in his works Elias' division of logic,⁶⁴) develops the normative fivefold division of syllogistic statements⁶⁵) into an independent ontological theory, dissociated from the original purpose it was designed to serve: the justification of the descriptive division of logic. For him, the division of syllogistic statements into demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical, and poetic becomes primary and axiomatic⁶⁶) — as a matter of fact, he says that these five are the only ways in which the human mind can think.⁶⁷) The trend, therefore, of shifting from the descriptive function of classification to the normative one, which started with Alexandrian scholarship, reaches its logical conclusion with al-Fārābī in whom normative classification becomes autonomous.

Closely related to this is another trend, also incipient in Alexandrian scholarship, which al-Fārābī carries through to its logical extreme. If

⁶³) On the importance of classification in Islamic civilization cf. Rosenthal, *Das Fortleben*, pp. 77–79 = *Classical Heritage*, pp. 52–54.

⁶⁴) This was first noted some time ago by R. Walzer, *Zur Traditionsgeschichte der aristotelischen Poetik*, in: *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica*, N.S. 11, 1934, p. 13 [repr. Greek into Arabic, p. 135]. W. Heinrichs' *aporia* (*Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik*, Beyrut 1969, p. 131), that al-Fārābī reproduces Elias despite the fact that Elias was not known to the Arabs, is hereby solved: the transmitter was Paul the Persian.

⁶⁵) Diagram V (without claiming to be exhaustive) lists the works in which al-Fārābī uses this classification and the names which he gives to each kind of syllogistic statement. It is noteworthy that in the *Ilḥād' al-'ulūm* alone he deviates from his usual terminology and uses that in Paul's treatise. This is another, however slight, indication that al-Fārābī is dependent here upon an outside source which both he and Miskawaih are following.

⁶⁶) al-Fārābī seems to know nothing of, or at least not to mention, the division of syllogisms into three (demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical) by al-Kindī, who derives his information from a different source (Guidi-Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindī I*, text p. 401, trans. p. 416).

⁶⁷) *Alfāz* 96f. (Mahdi): *ad-dihnu laisa lahu nqiḡādun āḡaru siwā hāḡiḡi l-ḡamsa*.

normative classification reflects ontological reality, the way things are, it can also reflect *historical* reality, the way things actually happened. A hint of this is found in the Alexandrian discussion, initiated by the epilogue of *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, about Aristotle's historical precedence in establishing the theoretical rules for the different kinds of syllogistic statements which, naturally, existed before him. In a significant passage of the introduction to the commentary on the *Categoriae* (i.e., prolegomenon No. 5, above) by Olympiodorus, the teacher of Elias, we read the following:

Both Plato and Aristotle are worthy of our admiration, Aristotle because he distinguished and discovered the rules in isolation from the subject matter itself, and Plato because he used demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) without rules. For the philosophers before Aristotle (οἱ παλαιοί) knew how to use demonstration, but did not know the theory behind it, in this respect resembling those who use shoes without knowing how to make them. One should not consider Plato inferior to Aristotle on account of this, but on the contrary, superior, because Plato, when using demonstration, did not need Aristotle's demonstrative method, while Aristotle, [in discovering the demonstrative method,] needed Plato's [actual] demonstrations. Similarly, Homer and Demosthenes needed neither Aristotle's *Poetica* nor Hermogenes' *Rhetorica*, but rather Aristotle and Hermogenes needed *their* writings in order to establish the poetic and rhetorical methods. [CAG XII.i, pp. 17.37–18.10]

The same note of historical development — first the practice, then the theory — is struck by al-Fârâbî in the introduction to his own commentary on the *Categoriae*, in a passage obviously derived from the Alexandrian prolegomena though not from Olympiodorus. The passage runs as follows:

Of the things that are included in the art of logic, the following two were established before the time of Aristotle: 1) What was practised was practised not with the aid of [the rules of] logic, but through skill and the competence that arises from long application to the performance of the art (since it so happened that people applied themselves without possessing the rules governing such practice), like the competence of Protagoras in sophistical argumentation, of Thrasymachus in rhetoric, and of Homer in poetry. Orations and poems were established by themselves, not on the basis of rules which one can use to produce similar orations and poems. 2) What was written was partial and scanty, like the various kinds of meters in the case of poetry, proverbial expressions in the case of rhetoric, and similar things in dialectic. But as for the contention that the order in which these [logical] arts ought

to be existed before Aristotle, it is not true. The credit for this belongs to Aristotle alone.⁶⁸⁾

The intimations of normative classification as history implicit in these passages, however, are developed into a full-fledged system in the second part of al-Fârâbî's *K. al-Ḥurûf*, a work much less dependent on Alexandrian prototypes than his formal commentaries.⁶⁹⁾ In it al-Fârâbî classifies all the sciences in the following chronological sequence: pre-Platonic: rhetoric, poetry, record-keeping, grammar, writing, mathematical sciences, physical sciences, sophistics, dialectics; Plato: political science; Aristotle: demonstration, (metaphysics?); post-Aristotelian: religious legislation, *fiqh*, *kaldm*. This is, in effect, nothing else but the classification of the sciences found in the *Iḥṣâ' al-'ulûm* set in a historical perspective. The correspondence between the ontological classification in the *Iḥṣâ' al-'ulûm* and the historical classification in the *K. al-Ḥurûf* is best illustrated in diagram VI. The system which thus emerges marks the culmination of a long process of development whose starting point was the method of classification by division as a tool for research and instruction. By late Alexandrian times, this method had acquired a second, normative, function, which tended to overshadow the earlier, descriptive one. The implications of the normative function as reflecting both ontological and historical reality began to be recognized also by this time, but they were exhausted, after a long gestation period in the Syriac tradition whose two termini we can tentatively identify in this particular case as Paul the Persian and Abû Bišr Mattâ, only with al-Fârâbî. It is a rare accomplishment of idealist philosophy.⁷⁰⁾

⁶⁸⁾ *Alfâz* 110.5–111.2 (Mahdi). Cf. a similar passage in al-Fârâbî's *K. al-Ḥudûba*, in Langhade and Grignaschi, *Deux ouvrages*, p. 55.

⁶⁹⁾ M. Mahdi, ed., al-Fârâbî's Book of Letters, Beirut 1970, pp. 142–153. A detailed summary and analysis of this part are provided by the same author's *Alfarabi on Philosophy and Religion*, in: *The Philosophical Forum*, IV.1, 1972, pp. 5–25.

⁷⁰⁾ This idealist systematization of cultural history apparently became the accepted view in subsequent times. We find references to it in, e.g., Avicenna and Suhrawardî Maqtûl. Avicenna, *aš-Šifâ', al-Ilâhiyât* VII.ii (Cairo 1370/1960, p. 310.11–13): "When the Greeks first occupied themselves with philosophy, it was rhetorical (*ḥuṭbiya*), and then it was mixed with sophistry (*ġalaṭ*; perhaps *muġālaṭa*?) and dialectics (*ġadal*). The first of its parts [i.e., excluding the parts of logic which is only an instrument of philosophy] to come to the people was physics; then they began to pay attention to mathematics and then to metaphysics." This passage clearly derives from al-Fârâbî's systematization and not, as G. Verbeke suggests, from Aristocles of Messena's (ultimately Aristotle's?) *De Philosophia*

The net effect of this scheme is to explain the order of things, both ontological and historical, and thereby render irrelevant the questions of, and debates about, the superiority of logic over grammar, or philosophy over religion. Logic and grammar, philosophy and religion, are shown by al-Fârâbî to be *complementary* parts of the *same* system, not posited as *contradictory* parts in two *different* systems, a position which was implicit in late Alexandrian Aristotelianism, explicit in Paul the Persian, and bitterly fought over in al-Fârâbî's contemporary intellectual circles in Bagdâd.⁷¹) By assigning, through classification, each part to its proper place in the way things are (ontology) and the way they developed (history), al-Fârâbî attempted to settle the debate by replacing it with a higher synthesis. The second part of his *K. al-Ḥurûf*, and its complement, *Ḥṣā' al-'ulûm*, are therefore direct responses to this debate which, smoldering through the centuries, flared up once again in Bagdâd in the first half of the tenth century, during al-Fârâbî's entire active adult life. Perhaps therein lies the key to his interest in political philosophy.

(Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima I-IV, Louvain-Leiden 1977, p. 3* note 3). Aristocles' fragment, which is preserved in Philoponus' and Asclepius of Tralles' commentaries on Nicomachus of Gerasa's Introduction to Arithmetic, deals with the five specific senses which the word σοφία had in the development of human society, not with the appearance and order of the sciences as such (see L. Tarán, Asclepius of Tralles, Commentary to Nicomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, N.S. 59.iv], Philadelphia 1969, pp. 73 f.). Furthermore, although Nicomachus' Introduction *was* translated into Arabic, there are no indications that any of the commentaries were.

Suhrawardî Maqtûl, *K. at-Takwîhât*, par. 86 (ed. H. Corbin, Istanbul 1945; p. 111): "Know that the great philosophers of antiquity since the rhetorical era of philosophy (*mundu kânât al-ḥikma ḥitâbiya*), men like . . . Hermes, . . . Agathodaimon, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and . . . Plato, were of greater rank and importance than every known Muslim philosopher who distinguished himself in the demonstrative sciences (*al-burhânîyyât*)." Suhrawardî's unorthodox list of philosophers is due to his own peculiar interest in the alchemical tradition; but his division of the philosophical eras into rhetorical and demonstrative reflects al-Fârâbî's systematization.

⁷¹) See above, the concluding paragraphs of Sections I and II of this paper, and especially note 57.

ELIAS: CAG XVIII.i, pp. 26.6-31.32




DIAGRAM Ia

DAVID: CAG XVIII.ii, pp. 55.17-75.2




DIAGRAM Ib

PAUL THE PERSIAN: Land, Anecdota Syriaca, pp. 4.25-5.19




DIAGRAM Ic

Classification of the Parts of Philosophy in General
(Prolegomenon No. 1)

ELIAS: CAG XVIII.i, pp. 115.14-116.28

ARISTOTLE'S LECTURE COURSES




DIAGRAM II

Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy
(Prolegomenon No. 4)


PAUL THE PERSIAN: in Miskawaih, *Tartib as-sa'âdât*

DIAGRAM III

Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy
(Prolegomenon No. 4)

Elias: CAG XVIII.i, 116.29-117.14






DIAGRAM IVa

Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy
(Prolegomenon No. 4)

Paul in Miskawayh, *Tarīb al-sa'ādāt*




SYNTHETIC APPROACH
alā tārīq at-tarkīb



ANALYTIC APPROACH
alā tārīq at-taḥlīl

DIAGRAM IVb
Classification of the Parts of Aristotle's Philosophy
(Prolegomenon No. 4)

Division acc. to the
name of each book
[Alfāz 106]



----- Syllogistic statements are divided into five -----

Division acc. to the purpose of each book [Alfāz 106]

<i>Iḥṣā' al-'ulūm</i>	INDUCING CERTAINTY	INDUCING STRONG OPINIONS	PERSUASIVE	INDUCING ERROR	INDUCING IMAGINARY IMPRESSIONS
	(yaqīniya) [al-Fārābī in Alfāz: AN. PR. (qiyās) & AN. POST. (burhān) are sometimes counted as one book]	(ḡunūniya) TOP.	(muqni'a) RHET.	(muḡliṭa) SOPH. EL.	(muḡhayyila) POET.
Alfāz	yaqīniya	ḡadaliya	ḥuṭbiya	muḡālatiya	ṣi'riya
Qawānīn ṣin. aṣ-ṣu'arā';	{ burhāniya	ḡadaliya	ḥuṭbiya	sūfistā'iya- muḡālatiya	ṣi'riya
Mā yanbaḡī ...		more true than false	equally true and false	more false than true	all false
Ḥurūf	burhāniya	ḡadaliya	ḥuṭbiya	sūfistā'iya	ṣi'r
Introductory 'Risāla':	{ burhāniya	ḡadaliya	ḥiṭābiya	sūfistā'iya	ṣi'riya
Ms. Hamid. 812					

DIAGRAM V

Normative Classification as History: *K. al-Hurāf*

PRE-PLATONIC		PLATO	ARIST.	POST-ARIST.
1 LANGUAGE	Writing Grammar Record-keeping			
2 LOGIC	Poetry Rhetoric		Demon- stration	
3 MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES	Mathematical sciences			
4 PHYSICAL SCIENCES METAPHYSICS	Physical sciences		Meta- physics(?)	
5 POLITICAL SCIENCE FIQH KALAM		Political science		Kalām Fiqh Political legislation

Normative Classification as Ontology: *Ḥudūd al-ʿulūm*

DIAGRAM VI

Al-Fārābī's Classification of the Sciences